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                                                            Introduction
            In his article The Punitive Coma[1] J.C. Oleson presents a radical solution  to  the  burning
issue of overcrowded, violent and expensive prisons in the United States.  Oleson proclaims: “The
warehouse  prison  doesn’t  incapacitate  prisoners  from  committing  further  offences;  it  merely
insulates them from the respectable taxpaying public. Like its medieval predecessors,  the  modern
warehouse prison is built to  contain  society’s  unwanted  souls.  Nothing  more.”[2]   The  author
nevertheless proposes a system  that  goes  further  than  this;  in  his  suggested  facility,  efficient
storing would be made perfect.  Indeed, he advocates putting prisoners  into  a  narcotic  coma  for
the duration of their sentences.
              After  presenting  his  idea  of  punitive  coma,  the  author  then   outlines   the   technical
possibilities of placing a person  into  an  induced  coma,  describing  precisely  the  technical  and
medical requirements as well as the potential risks and the ways to  reduce  them.  He  argues  that
suspending a prisoner’s consciousness would make it  possible  to  pack  each  one  into  a  limited
space with a minimum level of staff and thus a minimum of costs. Moreover it would be  virtually
impossible for the  inmates  to  commit  any  crime  against  the  other  inmates  or  the  correction
officers.
            Oleson claims that “the punitive coma is an enlightened form of punishment, as it  is  more
efficient and compassionate than the legitimized methods of punishment currently in  use.”[3]  He
argues that this form of punishment neither violates prisoners’ constitutional rights nor the  Eighth
Amendment  prohibition  of  cruel  and  unusual  punishment  and   outweighs   any   other   moral
threshold.
            Many people would argue that the proposal to comatose prisoners is such an  unacceptable
idea that it is not worth dealing with. However, I  consider  it  very  important  to  respond  to  this
unusual suggestion for the following reasons. First, I think Oleson’s proposal is such an indication
of the degradation and dehumanization of prisoners that it  should  not  be  published  without  any
reaction from  a  criminal  lawyer.   Second,  the  public  might  find  his  proposal  very  tempting
because it promises to make prisons much safer and especially much cheaper. Therefore, I  hold  it
necessary  to  give  a  thorough  account  of  various  moral,  legal  and  social  objections   to   the
replacement of conventional prisons with the permanent state of an artificial coma.
The Problems of the Modern Prison
            The idea of imprisonment as punishment is quite modern. Although prisons  can  be  found
early in most civilizations, they were usually used only to keep the accused in  custody  until  trial.
In Europe until late medieval times, crime used to be a private matter, which was solved in a  civil
law case. The offender or his clan had to compensate for the damage and,  in  more  serious  cases,
revenge  was  sought  in  feuds.  Later,  when  the  state  claimed  the   monopoly   over   violence,
individual body punishment was introduced, mainly in cruel public executions and mutilations.[4]
The kind of corporal punishment was supposed to reflect  the  crime  and  its  cruelty.  It  not  only
served as a general deterrent but demonstrated the power of the state.
            Two changes characterize modern penology: first,  the  public  nature  of  punishment  was
replaced by secret and  private  executions.  Second,  the  object  of  punishment  shifted  from  the
individual’s life and body to his[5] property and personal liberty. The prison  as  an  institution  of
punishment was thus born.
             Oleson  wants  to  solve  two  major  problems  of  modern  prisons,   violence   and   high
operational expenses. He spends  a  considerable  amount  of  space  in  his  article  describing  the
repugnant and violent conditions of American warehouse prisons, with frequent torture  and  rape,
high rates of suicide, and even killings committed or initiated not only  by  prisoners  but  even  by
prison guards. He claims that “our warehouse prisons are animal factories” that are  “affirmatively
dehumanizing and brutal.”[6]
            However, violence in prisons is a problem that should be addressed other  than  by  merely
robbing the inmates of their consciousness. The Stanford Prison experiment[7]  demonstrated  that
there is a high violence potential in everybody, regardless of whether  or  for  what  reason  one  is
convicted and whether one is a prisoner or a prison officer. This well known  experiment  suggests
that the institution of imprisonment itself bears the roots of the  high  crime  and  violence  rate  in
prison. The conclusion that must be drawn is that the very concept of “imprisonment” needs to  be
reconsidered. If a society starts fighting violence by simply transforming people into  unconscious
objects, it  misses  the  chance  to  develop  strategies  to  understand,  prevent  or  at  least  reduce
aggression in the first place.
            According to Oleson, besides prison violence, the  most  compelling  problem  is  the  high
cost  of  operating  and  constructing  new  prisons  to  cope  with  the  rapid   increase   of   prison
population in the last  three  decades.  The  amount  of  money  spent  on  correctional  facilities  is
enormous,[8] and, of course, diminishes public spending elsewhere; Wray, for  example,  suggests
that the increasing spending on prisons leads to substantial  cuts  in  education.[9]  Oleson,  on  the
other hand, estimates that in his proposed coma-bay facility the costs could be cut  drastically:  the
staff required for a 1000  man  unit  would  be  only  eight  nursing  aides,  two  full-time  licensed
practical nurses,  a  physician’s  assistant  and  an  anesthesiologist,  to  feed,  clean,  medicate  the
prisoners  and  prevent  any  side-effects  of  narcotic  comas.  By  little  more  than  doubling   the
personnel budget, the numbers of prisoners could be increased from 1,000 to  10,000  inmates.[10]
However, this calculation does not take into account the risks of technical problems. If there  were
an accident and a number of prisoners “awoke” at the same time, a shortage in staff might be fatal.
Furthermore, prisoners cost society the highest amount after they have been  released,  due  to  the
high rate of recidivism. According to Levitt, the year after  release  from  prison,  a  prisoner  costs
society approximately $80,000 because he will find it  hard  to  find  a  job  and  quickly  commits
crimes again.[11] This  figure  would  probably  be  much  higher  for  inmates  leaving  coma-bay
prisons, since they have no chance of rehabilitation or employment. Furthermore, Oleson does not
consider the loss of jobs and infrastructure now related to  prisons.  Gonnerman  describes  prisons
as “the North Country’s largest growth industry” during the last twenty years.[12]
Deterrence and Retribution
             Oleson  argues  that  the  four  classic  theories  of   punishment—retribution,   deterrence,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation—do not form a coherent system of penology but rather  compete
with each other. He claims that prison “is a construction without a clear theoretical  mandate.”[13]
Nonetheless, Oleson argues that  the  punitive  coma  “serves  the  same  goals  of  deterrence  and
retribution”[14]
            In most societies the core of criminal justice is the notion that a  committed  wrong  has  to
be put right by retribution. Often, in connection with religion, there is the sense  that  by  imposing
suffering on the  perpetrator,  the  “good  order”  has  to  be  reinforced  rebalancing  the  scales  of
justice. In many cases this is  also  the  victim’s  first  interest.  According  to  retributive  theories,
punishment is the morally necessary response to crime. Retributive punishment is seen  as  an  end
itself, which serves no other purpose than in responding to the violation of the victim’s rights with
the  violation  of  the  offender’s  rights.  Consequently,  it   is   crucial   that   the   punishment   is
proportional to the crime.[15] The difficulty of finding a sentence proportional  to  the  committed
crime is not a question of the form of punishment but rather of the process of sentencing itself and
thus a problem for the courts. A prison sentence does not become more or less proportional  if  the
prisoner is put into a narcotic coma.
              Another   problem   with   proportionality   is   that   a   sentence   served   in   a   state   of
unconsciousness might be seen as paradoxically both too hard or too lenient at the same  time.  As
this Article will later demonstrate, the punitive coma is  much  crueler  than  conventional  prisons
and thus out  of  proportion  to  any  committed  crime.  However,  I  am  sure  that  many  people,
especially the victims or their families, would find the  idea  that  the  perpetrator  “sleeps”—while
they have to live  with  the  suffering,  as  unbearably  lenient.  Although  I  disagree,  some  might
conclude that a coma is less severe than  the  hard  reality  of  overcrowded  prisons.  In  this  case,
retribution would not be well served.[16]
            The utilitarian deterrence theories hold that the act of punishing  a  crime  can  prevent  the
criminal from reoffending (individual  deterrence)  and  discourage  the  rest  of  the  society  from
committing a crime (general deterrence). Indeed, one might well think that the  experience  of  the
loss of his life was so horrible that he would not ever want to repeat it and would not  commit  any
crime again. However, especially in cases of longer sentences in the coma-bay prisons,  the  effect
might be directly the opposite. When the prisoner is released after several years, the world he used
to know might be so much  changed  that  he  would  hardly  recognize  it.  I  invite  the  reader  to
remember the world of twenty years ago. In 1986 the Cold War was  at  its  height;  people  would
communicate by post instead of emails and use telephones instead  of  mobile  phones.  Given  the
current difficulties of reintegrating long-term prisoners in society,  the  reintegration  of  the  once-
comatose former prisoner would be much less likely than today and  he  might  well  return  to  his
criminal lifestyle.[17]
            More importantly, both individual deterrence and  general  deterrence  are  undermined  by
the limited role the prospect of punishment play at the time of commission of the crime.  One  can
divide the majority of committed crimes into two categories. In the first, the offender believes that
the chances of getting caught are slim and hopes to avoid any punishment, no matter how  light  or
severe it is. In the latter, the offender is  in  such  an  emotionally  excited  state  that  his  focus  is
merely on the crime as such, and he is not open to rational evaluation of any further consequences.
In the former situation, certainty of punishment would probably prevent a considerable number  of
people from offending.[18] In the latter, I there is no  room  for  deterrence  through  the  threat  of
punishment no matter how severe it is. The threat of punishment might only  indirectly  affect  the
decision of whether to offend by, for example, raising society’s condemnation and,  consequently,
elevating offender’s moral threshold. 
                                                            Human Rights
             The achievement of the Enlightenment movement is the common notion that no human
shall be made an object of state power but will always be certain of his dignity. Today,
“civilization” means that even enemies of society are treated respectfully because we do not want
to respond to barbaric behavior with barbaric treatment.  We claim to behave humane by treating
everybody, criminals included, as humans. Oleson, in contrast, while explaining how to reduce
medical risks, suggests that the “coma-bay prisoner should be thought of as a (living) machine,
with inputs and outputs.”[19]
            The reader should realize that he proposes to transform human beings into objects with  no
consciousness, who are little more than their physical bodies. One has  to  be  clear  about  what  it
means to be put into and kept in an artificial coma. It is not just a  state  of  peaceful  sleep,  as  the
author tries to let us assume. Transforming criminals  into  mere  objects  is  dehumanising  in  the
truest sense of the word. It means that the person is not able to exercise any human  activity,  even
simple things such as speaking to a friend, reflecting on one’s day or simply  having  day  dreams.
Oleson illustrates himself how inhuman coma-bay prisons would be:
Although rehabilitation is dead in American corrections, its vestiges linger and consume  a
significant fraction of our resources. Since coma-bay  prisoners  will  remain  unconscious,
supplementary services like  counseling,  libraries,  or  education  can  be  eliminated  from
corrections budgets. Space-inefficient features such as weight rooms,  exercise  yards,  and
visiting facilities can be eliminated entirely, allowing the  coma-bay  prison  administration
to fit additional inmates into each facility.[20]
            Only in his conclusion does Oleson  mention  that  punitive  coma  “denies  a  fundamental
value of Anglo-American jurisprudence: the physical integrity of the  individual.  It  compromises
human dignity.”[21] But besides this single brief mention, there is no reference to this criticism.
             In Oleson’s coma-bay prison  inmates  are  denied  the  basic  human  rights  despite  their
being unconscious and thus unaware of their situation. The comatose prisoner  cannot  express  his
opinion, enjoy education, communicate with his family, inform himself  about  the  latest  politics,
associate with others, be legally counseled; he is not even allowed to talk, to pray or  even  just  to
think. I hold that all human rights are violated, because the prisoner is not  allowed  any  longer  to
be a human. Even the right of physical integrity is restricted, since it embraces not only the lack of
injury and pain but also the right to control and to use the body. Indeed  the  right  to  life  itself  is
disregarded, because the permanent unconscious state can hardly be called human life.  Moreover,
the prisoner will be aware of what he has lost, once he is allowed to regain consciousness.
            Oleson argues that the considerable advantages of comatosing prisoners justify  the  denial
of  constitutional  rights.  He  examines  possible  violations  of   freedom   of   speech   (including
communication by mail, telephone access, and  communication  with  the  press),  of  the  right  of
assembly (including visitation), the right to free exercise of religion, and the right to counsel.  The
author follows two lines of argument. First, he shows that American  courts  tend  to  grant  prison
administrations a broad discretion to restrict prisoners’ rights and are very reluctant to interfere  in
prison officials’ scope for decision making. Thus Oleson expects that:
As long as reasonable attention is paid to the overall condition of confinement  (that  is,  as
long as comatose prisoners are physically  well  cared  for),  administrative  encroachments
upon secondary entitlements – for example, the right to free speech, the right to  assembly,
or the right to practice one’s religion – will not warrant judicial intervention.[22]
But as Douglas v. Sigler[23] stated: “the courts will not interfere  with  the  conduct,  management
and disciplinary control of this type of institution except in extreme cases.”[24]  Putting  prisoners
into a narcotic coma for the time of their sentence would  indeed  be  a  very  extreme  case.  Even
when it is said that “courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison
administration and reform,”[25] the intent is not to exclude  all  judicial  review  and  give  all  the
decision-making  power  to  the  administration.[26]  And  this  is  for   a   good   reason,   because
imprisonment is a very important part of political power  and  thus  in  a  system  of  separation  of
powers the judiciary has to control the executive in this area. 
            Secondly,  Oleson  argues  that  the  benefits  of  coma-bay  prisons  outweigh  the  already
restricted constitutional rights of prisoners and justify their elimination:
Already, these rights are dramatically truncated. The additional gains in safety and security
realized by using the punitive coma will certainly outweigh any additional losses to inmate
liberty. It is simply a matter of calculating the logistical issues, and ensuring that  prisoners
are not unnecessarily stripped of  their  limited  rights  to  speech,  assembly,  religion,  and
legal representation.[27]
Of course prisoners cannot enjoy the same rights as free  citizens,[28]  but  American  courts  have
repeatedly  made  it  clear  that   prisoners’   rights   have   to   be   balanced   against   penological
interests[29]  and  that  the  former  should  be  given  considerable  weight.  One   aspect   of   this
evaluation is the question whether there are alternative means for  the  prisoners  to  exercise  their
rights.[30] Obviously, this is not the case if the inmate is kept in coma.
            Oleson’s argument that punitive coma does not violate the U.S.  Constitution  is  not  quite
coherent. He admits that prisoners have rights under the Constitution, even if those  are  restricted:
“and precisely because American prisoners do remain some rights, it must be determined  whether
the  punitive  coma  will  withstand  legal  attacks  raised  in  U.S.   courts.”[31]   However,   when
examining these rights in particular, he only shows that these rights are restricted but not how it  is
justified to deny them altogether.
            A further problem not taken into account by Oleson is the effect of his scheme on spouses,
chidren, friends and  relatives  outside  the  prison.  Presently,  every  prison  sentence  effects  and
harms the prisoner’s community, especially his family.[32] Yet even a remote prisoner can play  a
role  in  a  family  in  absentia;[33]  families  even  move  near  the  prison  to   be   closer   to   the
prisoner.[34] In Procunier v. Martinez[35]  the  Supreme  Court  acknowledged  that  a  prisoner’s
wife has an interest in communicating with him which is  protected  by  the  First  and  Fourteenth
Amendments. Later, in Overton v. Bazzeta,[36] while upholding severe restrictions  on  visitation,
the Court purposely stopped short of denying that some family  members  possessed  associational
rights.  Oleson’s  proposal  would  render  impossible  communication  and   association   between
inmates and intimate family members. Indeed, it would unbearable on prisoners and family to  cut
a prisoner off completely from the family life and make it impossible for  him  to  share  important
events like weddings or deaths or to be asked his advice in important family decisions.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
             Arguing that the state of punitive coma is not unusual but rather innovative, and not  more
but rather less cruel than the present crowded and violent prisons, the  author  infers  that  punitive
coma  does  not  violate  the  prohibition  of  cruel  and  unusual  punishment  found  in  the  Eight
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.[37] His argument is that “[if] anything, the punitive coma is
less cruel and less unusual than crowded warehouse prisons or supermax facilities.”[38]
            It  is  true  that  the  unpleasant  physical  and  psychological  conditions  under  which  the
inmates have to try to survive would be eliminated with punitive coma.[39] However, I argue  that
comatosing human beings is even crueler than the present situation in prisons. Even if the inmates
live under constant fear and in violent struggle they are  able  to  behave  as  humans,  to  think,  to
pray, and to reflect about their past, present and future actions. Even if one at a first  glance  thinks
that at least the inmate has no pain, one has to agree that the narcotic coma is worse than pain: it is
like being buried alive.
            Oleson asks us to  imagine  that  we  had  to  advise  a  convicted  person  whether  to  face
violence and rape for years, or a painless sleep. Although the latter option seems to very  tempting
in this scenario, one has to remember that in extreme cases sometimes one even considers death to
be the lesser evil. Still, we would not advise people to commit suicide or even make a  nationwide
policy of it.
            Prisons have been judged to be “cruel” if they  deprive  inmates  of  the  minimal  civilized
measures of life’s necessities.[40] I argue that these “civilized measures” are more than  food  and
health. I understand that essential human practices, such as reading, writing, or founding a  family,
are not seen as fundamental necessities; however, other basic  human  needs  such  as  thinking  or
communicating with others are. It is not enough to  be  fed  and  cleaned.  Punitive  coma  is  cruel
because it deprives inmates of the exercise of their essential humanity.
            Since Oleson’s proposal is a  new  idea,  and  only  possible  now  that  medical  science  is
advanced enough to keep a human being in constant coma for  such  a  long  time,  Oleson  argues
that coma-bay prisons are innovative rather than unusual. It can easily  be  acknowledged  that  the
constitution of a country  allows  changes  and  developments.  However,  it  is  the  function  of  a
constitution that certain rights are guaranteed and that  the  citizens  cannot  be  deprived  of  them
even  if  society  undergoes  significant  changes.[41]  This  is  especially  true  of   the   American
Constitution,  which  can  only  be  amended,  but  not  changed.  Each  development   has   to   be
considered  very  carefully  in  this  light.  I  hold  that   the   idea   of   taking   away   somebody’s
consciousness—and thus excluding him from any human activity and putting him  in  a  vegetable
state—differs so much from any other known form  of  punishment  that  it  is  cruel  and  unusual
indeed.
                                                            American Society
            Oleson describes  three  approaches  of  tackling  the  problem  of  over-populated  prisons:
construction, diversion and crowding. An approach that he does  not  consider  at  all  is  to  try  to
reduce the number of people being sentenced to prison in the first place. As  well  as  crime  being
part of society, so are prisons. Especially in the United States where  the  prison  population  is  so
incredibly  high,[42]  prisons  are  an  essential  problem  of  society.        What  is  needed   is   an
understanding of why so many U.S. American citizens are imprisoned. Do  the  roots  of  the  high
prison population lie in the judicial system? According to Morgan, “[t]he rate of  imprisonment  is
not  determined  by  factors  beyond  government  control.  It  is  ultimately  a  matter  of  political
choice.”[43] Or does the key lie in American social structure and organization?[44]  Alternatively,
could we draw conclusions  from  the  fact  that  by  far  the  majority  of  American  prisoners  are
extremely poorly educated, and most have been unemployed before being imprisoned?[45]
            One related factor behind the high prison population is the high rate  of  crime.  Why  does
the U.S.  have  such  a  high  crime  rate?  Is  American  society  more  violent  than  that  of  other
countries? If so, what are the reasons for this? The comparison with  other  Western  countries,  of
which none has nearly as many prisoners as the  United  States,  shows  that  there  must  be  other
ways of  addressing  crime.  Oleson  accuses  conventional  prisons  of  being  “an  inefficient  and
ineffective means of controlling crime,”[46] but he does not show us  whether  the  punitive  coma
would affect the crime rate in any way.
            A huge prison population as well as a high crime rate show that something must be  wrong
with the society that is affected by them.[47] Thus, prisons are  in  the  first  place  a  social  rather
than an economic or technical problem, and what is needed is  a  social,  not  a  medical,  solution.
The author illustrates very convincingly how easily, safely and cheap new scientific  methods  can
cope with the bad  situation.  However,  even  the  best  science  cannot  heal  growing  cancers  of
society by putting plasters over the wounds. Oleson counters that medical  treatments  are  already
used in criminal justice: “If medical  procedures  can  be  used  for  punitive  purposes,  if  we  can
punish sex offenders by chemically castrating them, then we  can  probably  also  incapacitate  our
most serious prisoners by placing  them  into  narcotic  comas.”[48]  But  involuntary  sterilization
does affect only one part of the individual, not the person as a whole.[49]
            Oleson comforts us by stating, “We may feel uncomfortable with punishing  our  offenders
by treating them with medical therapies (especially in the absence of any penological commitment
to rehabilitation), but we would shed  these  scruples  with  time.”[50]  The  thought  that  scruples
would become weak over time might be true but nonetheless cannot provide any justification.  But
it is not only  the  idea  of  a  medical  approach  to  a  social  problem  that  is  disturbing.  Storing
prisoners together and packing them in the smallest space cannot be  a  solution  to  crime.  Rather
than   treating   the   symptoms,   the   roots   of   the   problem    have    to    be    researched    and
addressed.[51] Reducing the negative side-effects  of  imprisonment—crime  rates  within  prisons
and high costs—might even worsen the problem, as it takes it out of sight  of  the  public.  Society
has to deal with its problem directly and not just hide them away, neither in  conventional  prisons
nor in transforming criminals into mere objects.
            In modern Western views the conception still prevails  that  human  beings  can  overcome
their more animalistic tendencies with human morals rather than just impair them  with  narcotics.
It is humankind’s challenge to overcome behavior that we classify as crime. We should not  try  to
run away from this task. Martinson states that we have “denie[]d . . . both the  normality  of  crime
in society and the personal normality of a very large proportion  of  offenders,  criminals  who  are
merely responding to the facts and conditions of our society.”[52]
            Many of the problems addressed in conventional prisons,  especially  the  violence  among
inmates, arise in significant part because of  the  under-funding  of  prisons.  However,  the  under-
funding as such is not addressed by Oleson’s article. Clearly, the United States is  not  so  poor  as
not to be able to afford to spend more money on prisons. It is not a question of funds as  such,  but
rather of their distribution. In my opinion,  the  reasons  why  prisons  have  such  a  small  priority
compared to other funded projects, even though  the  incredible  situation  of  prisoners  is  known,
shows the small importance that is attributed to the prisoners themselves. When  a  system  on  the
one hand produces such an enormous percentage  of  imprisoned  citizens  but  on  the  other  hand
refuses to fund  prisons  accordingly,  it  must  be  asked  what  society  sees  in  its  prisoners.  An
illustration is provided by the statement of a  neighbor  of  the  new  supermax  prison  in  Malone,
New York, where two inmates share a 14-by-8.5-foot cell: “You’ have to be a  total  animal  to  be
locked up like that […] I think it would drive me nuts. But we don’t know who’s going to  occupy
the cell. He probably deserves that or worse.”[53]
             The  lack  of  interest  in  and  respect  for  prisoners  will  even  grow  when  inmates   are
completely cut off from the outside world. At present, prisoners are still part of society, even if  an
unwanted one; but in coma-bay prisons they would be completely excluded from society.  Inmates
will be out  of  sight  of  society  and  they  will  not  even  be  able  to  observe  passively  what  is
happening in the outside world.
            This approach of getting unwanted people out of the sight of  society  could  easily  spread
into other areas. If a system decides to cope with the problem of crime, violence and  prisons  with
the proposed measures, it is only a small step to address other problems  with  the  same  methods.
Why not put a mentally disabled person in a coma until better treatments are found? And where  is
the line between mental illness and mental handicap? Why not stop the  suffering  of  seriously  ill
people by letting them sleep  for  an  indefinite  time?  What  about  other  problematic  groups  of
society, or those who are perceived as problematic  by  the  mainstream?  Twenty  years  ago  (and
according to some people even today) homosexuals would be  considered  appropriate  candidates.
The  same  might  be  true  for  drug-addicted  and  later  even  unemployed  or  homeless   people.
Treatments that most of us  would  reject  because  they  remind  us  of  Fascist  practices  in  Nazi
Germany should not be allowed in the case of convicted criminals either.
The Criminal Justice System
            Furthermore, Oleson’s proposal  would  have  important  impacts  on  the  criminal  justice
system. First, he suggests that punitive coma may substitute for the death penalty. He  argues  that
one of the benefits of punitive coma is  that,  if  a  miscarriage  of  justice  is  detected,  the  inmate
always can be released.  I doubt if he could convince retentionists, who  now  reject  changing  the
death penalty into a  mandatory  life  sentence  without  parole,  to  agree  to  put  prisoners  into  a
lifetime sleep. But there is an additional concern: the number of  cases  in  which  innocent  people
are sentenced to death allow us to infer wrongful convictions in cases of long-term  imprisonment.
How can a convicted person who  is  rendered  unconscious  for  years  or  even  decades  fight  an
appeal case? He would be dependent on a lawyer or a friend to start an appeal case; he cannot take
his own initiative. But how could a lawyer question the  prisoner?  In  a  footnote  Oleson  tries  to
solve this problem by suggesting that the prisoners could be awakened periodically “to  participate
in  legal  proceedings  or  parole  hearings.”[54]   However,   there   is   no   consideration   of   the
psychological impact that waking up would have on the prisoner’s psyche. Furthermore, is it  very
questionable whether the  prisoner  could  give  reliable  statements  in  a  condition  in  which  his
thinking is reduced to a short time between long periods of unconsciousness. In  addition,  drop  in
the number of appeals or re-opened cases could  undermine  in  the  long  run  the  awareness  that
misjudgments are possible.
            What is more, the possibility of storing more people more cheaply in such  facilities  might
cause the prison population to rise. More effective ways of imprisonment as well as more efficient
ways of handling cases in courts, such as plea bargaining,[55] will not decrease  but  cumulatively
accelerate the process of locking people away, and both procedures would be paid for through  the
loss of individual rights.
            The criminal justice system would also have to reconsider the meaning of  “life  sentence.”
In Oleson’s proposed system “the prisoner can be allowed to age and to  die  within  the  comatose
state.”[56] But how would this end occur, when all life functions are  regulated  by  machines  and
the body does not act? What does it mean to age: is this merely a question of decline of  the  cells?
Should elderly people not have the opportunity to prepare mentally for death, speaking a last  time
with  loved  ones,  receiving  religious  blessing,  sorting  out  legal  maters  like  writing   a   will?
Moreover, does the artificial coma shorten or lengthen a lifetime? If the  latter,  would  there  be  a
policy concerning after how many years the life supporting system would be  switched  off?  What
would be the safeguards against misuse? Would there be a justification left not  to  switch  off  the
machine  immediately  to  cut  further  costs,  since  “the  thing  called  prisoner”  does  not  notice
experience in his life anyway?
Conclusion
            I agree with Oleson in that it is necessary and urgent to find  alternatives  to  this  inhuman
institution of imprisonment. However, the coma-bay prison is not an acceptable  replacement,  not
only because it ignores the inmates’ constitutional rights and  bears  several  serious  risks  for  the
criminal justice system as well as broader society, but most of all because it deprives the prisoners
of their human dignity. Regardless of the crime which has been committed, we cannot allow this.
------------------------------------
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